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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
nitely refuses to concern itself with proximity of cause. It says, "The
question remains as to the effect upon interstate commerce of the labor
practices involved; * * * the fact remains that the stoppage of those
(respondents) operations by industrial strife would have a most seri-
ous effect upon interstate commerce. In view of respondents' far flung
activities, it is idle to say the effect would be indirect or remote." 18
B. B.
CONTRACTS - CONSIDERATION-"'BANK NIGHITS"-PRoMISSORY
ESTOPPEL.-The defendant, in course of operating its theatre, held
what is commonly termed a "Bank Night".' Patrons of the theatre,
among whom was the plaintiff, were requested to enter their names
and addresses next to numbers in a book provided by the defendant,
who advertised publicly that the person whose number was drawn on
a certain night would be awarded a money prize. Plaintiff alleges
that he has done all the defendant had requested, that he was present
when his number was drawn, and that the defendant has refused pay-
ment of the prize money. Defendant moves to dismiss the complaint
for failure to state a cause of action on two grounds: (1) Lack of
consideration for promise to pay prize money; (2) the contract, if
the court finds consideration, is illegal and void as a lottery. Held,
motion to dismiss complaint denied. The plaintiff furnished adequate
consideration and according to a decision affirmed by the Court of
Appeals certain "Bank Night" schemes are not lotteries,2 and, there-
fore, are legal.3 Simmons v. Randforce Amusement Corp., 162 Misc.
491, 293 N. Y. Supp. 745 (1937).
Consideration need not be tangible property capable of delivery,
nor need it have monetary value,4 but it may consist in the promisee's
performance of something he was not already legally bound to do.'
The plaintiff furnished adequate consideration for the defendant's
'The Court seems to avoid the use of the word "direct" or "indirect";
it speaks of "the close and intimate effect," p. 625, "the close and intimate
relation," p. 624.
1 (1937) 37 COL. L. REv. 877.IN. Y. PENAL LAW § 1370: "A lottery is a scheme for the distribution of
property by chance among persons who have paid or agreed to pay a valuable
consideration for the chance, whether called a lottery, raffle, or gift, enterprise
or some other name".
'People v. Shafer, 160 Misc. 174, 289 N. Y. Supp. 694, aff'd, 273 N. Y.
475, 6 N. E. (2d) 410 (1936).
'ANsoN, CONTRACTS (Turck ed. 1929) 63.
'13 CORPUS JuRis 324; POLLOCK, CONTRACTS (4th ed. 1888) 166; 1 WILLis-
TON, CONTRACrS (1st ed. 1934) § 102a; Bigelow v. Bigelow, 95 Me. 17, 49 Atl.
49; Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co., 1 Q. B. 256 (1893).
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promise to award the prize money by signing his (the plaintiff's)
name in the book provided by the defendant, and in attending the
theatre the night of the drawing. He was legally bound to do neither.
In the case under discussion, the court expressed the opinion that
the plaintiff's right to recover might rest on the doctrine of promis-
sory estoppel. 6 The doctrine of promissory estoppel has been stated
succinctly as that by which action by the promisee in justifiable re-
liance on the promise, will make the promise binding,7 even though
such action had not been requested by the promisor as the price or
exchange for his promise. In the instant case not only was the ac-
tion of the plaintiff, the promisee, in signing his name and attending
the theatre, requested by the defendant, the promisor, but it would
result in conceivable benefit to him in tending to increase his business.
Consequently, the situation was not one in which the doctrine of
promissory estoppel would apply in its strictest sense and as to that
part of the decision was dicta. Moreover the application of the doc-
trine to the case in hand is rather startling in view of the previously
expressed attitude of the courts of this state to limit or confine the
application of the doctrine to charitable subscription cases. 8
The objection to the contract on the ground that it was illegal
as a lottery has been removed by a decision of the Court of Appeals
holding that a "Bank Night" scheme is not a lottery under Sections
1370 and 1376 of the Penal Law.9 No valuable consideration, within
meaning of Section 1370, was given by the promisee for the chance.10
"Wecht, J. "Looking at the question from a broader point of view, the
same result can be arrived at on the theory of promissory estoppel * * *. The
public has the right to trust implicitly these semi-public institutions (the
theatres). It.would be an unwarranted breach of faith on the part of a theatre
to renege on its promise to award the advertised prize." These words may be
significant for the future of "promissory estoppel" in New York courts.
'Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua County Bank, 246 N. Y. 369,
159 N. E. 173 (1927).
'Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua County Bank, 246 N. Y. 369,
159 N. E. 173 (1927) ; Comfort v. McCorkle, 149 Misc. 826, 268 N. Y. Supp.
192 (1933); Quincey Co. v. City Service, 156 Misc. 83, 282 N. Y. Supp. 294
(1935).
SN. Y. PENAL LAW § 1376: "A person who offers for sale or distribution,
in any way, real or personal property, or any interest therein to be determined
by lot or chance, dependent upon the drawing of a lottery within or without the
state, or who sells, furnishes or procures, or causes to be sold, furnished or
procured, in any manner, a chance, or share, or any interest in property offered
for sale or distribution, in violation of this article, or a ticket or other evidence
of such chance, share or interest is guilty of a misdemeanor".
" People v. Shafer, 160 Misc. 174, 289 N. Y. Supp. 649, aff'd, 273 N. Y.
475, 6 N. E. (2d) 410 (1936). Kohlmetz, J.: " * * * I fail to see how the
requirement of the participant being in the theatre or lobby constitutes payment
of a valuable consideration or 'agreement to pay it. In my opinion either the
payment of a valuable consideration or an agreement to pay for a chance must
precede the drawing * * * there was a distinct understanding with the people
who signed the book that they would not be required to pay anything for the
chance, and that they assumed no obligation whatever. They are not even
required to purchase a ticket of admission, and the winner could go into the
1937]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
The court distinguishes its decision by which it finds a valuable con-
sideration in the instant case for the defendant's promise, in this
fashion: "True it is that some dicta will be found in the opinion
that the so-called 'Bank Night' promises were void because of lack
of consideration. However, the rule promulgated in a criminal prose-
cution is unlike that in a civil suit. * * * the above cases construed
a criminal statute. Criminal statutes must be strictly construed. The
rights of a prize winner were in no wise discussed or involved, and
any reference to the invalidity of the contract by reason of inade-
quate consideration must be assumed to be obiter dictum." n
L..
CONTRACT - DECEIT - REPREsENTATIONS-OPINIONS.-This is
an action for deceit brought against the defendant corporation for the
alleged fraudulent statements made by its sales agent, one Freeman.
The alleged fraud arose in the following manner: The plaintiff, a
noted violinist, purchased the violin in question from Freeman with a
certificate stating that the violin was the work of a great "Master,
Antonius Stradivarius in Cremona 1717 as shown by the label it
bears", and that the "top" (also described as "belly" or "table") was
of "Spruce of Stradivarius' choicest selection and unique among his
violins as we have seen by reason of its unusual strength". It is fur-
ther to be noted that in its numerous previous sales the instrument
had always been regarded as a genuine Stradivarius. The plaintiff,
after using the violin satisfactorily for more than ten years, and after
stating, "It is one of the finest Stradivarius violins in existence and
totally unsurpassed" discovered that the "left half of the top" was not
the original work of Stradivarius, but that it was the substituted work
of, probably, a French artisan, who had made repairs upon the instru-
ment in 1840 and 1850. Therefore the plaintiff brought this action
for the difference between what he had paid for the violin and its
actual value. Held, judgment for plaintiff in lower court reversed
and complaint dismissed. No action lies for deceit where scienter,
a necessary element of the tort, is lacking or where the statements
made by the agent were mere opinions or beliefs rather than repre-
sentations. Banner v. Lyon and Healy, 249 App. Div. 569, 293 N. Y.
Supp. 236 (1st Dept. 1937).
Deceit actions will lie when one party to an agreement know-
theatre to obtain his prize without any expense to him." People v. Mail &
Express Co., 179 N. Y. Supp. 640 (1919), aff'd, 231 N. Y. 586, 132 N. E. 898
(1921).
' Wecht, J., in Simmons v. Randforce Amusement Corp., 162 Misc. 491,
293 N. Y. Supp. 745 (1937).
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